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The first part of the paper reports the results from a sequence of laboratory experiments 
comparing the bidding behavior for multiple contracts in three different sealed bid 
auction mechanisms; first-price simultaneous, first-price sequential and first-price 
combinatorial bidding. The design of the experiment is based on experiences from a 
public procurement auction of road markings in Sweden. Bidders are asymmetric in 
their cost functions; some exhibit decreasing average costs of winning more than one 
contract, whereas other bidders have increasing average cost functions. The 
combinatorial bidding mechanism is demonstrated to be most efficient. The second part 
of the paper describes how the lab experiment was followed up by a field test of a 
combinatorial procurement auction of road markings. 
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 1. INTRODUCTION  
Using the standard first-price sealed bid auction, Sweden’s National Road Administration 
(henceforth the Road Administration) annually awards some 60 contracts for the updating of 
road markings on national roads, subsequently referred to as road painting: Firms are invited 
to submit a bid on each contract, prior to an announced point in time. The bids on each 
contract are then evaluated separately and independently, and the firm submitting the lowest 
bid on a certain contract is awarded it, the same or another firm submitting the lowest bid on 
another is awarded that contract and so on. We consider this as a number of simultaneous 
auctions for identical, or at least very similar, objects. 
 
Previous analyses of the bidding in these procurement auctions have demonstrated that there 
are two types of bidders for the contracts; ‘large’ and ‘small’ (Eklöf & Lunander (1999)). In 
the present paper, we conjecture that large suppliers submitting bids on more than one 
contract have decreasing average costs (synergies) in the number of contracts they win. A 
firm with synergies across combinations of contracts is then exposed to the risk of failing to 
acquire some contracts of a package, thereby ending up being paid less than its cost for 
executing the set of won contracts. To curb this risk, the firm may submit less aggressive bids, 
which then generates a risk that the lowest-cost supplier is not awarded the contracts. If a 
large firm still wins all contracts in the bundle, it may then earn supranormal profits.  
 
Furthermore, we conjecture that because of capacity constraints, small bidders have 
increasing average costs in the number of contracts they are awarded. For this reason, small 
firms may also submit less aggressive bids or may abstain from bidding on some contracts to 
avoid the risk of ending up with more jobs than they have the capacity to carry out. This 
  2jeopardizes the small firms’ possibility to stay in business and makes it difficult for new ones 
to enter, which is harmful for the competitive pressure in the industry at large. 
 
One way of reducing the exposure problem for the procurer would be to substitute the 
standard sealed-bid mechanism for a simultaneous multiple round (SMR) auction with the 
opportunity for bid withdrawal  or the option to submit package bids. The former type of 
auction was used in connection with the allocation of spectrum licenses in the United States 
(cf. Cramton (1997), Milgrom (1998), CRA (1998), Cybernomics, Inc (2000a)). The first use 
of combinatorial bidding for spectrum licenses in the US is scheduled to 2003; see 
www.fcc.gov. In the presence of synergies across contracts, the SMR auction format may 
generate higher efficiency and higher revenue (lower procurement cost) than a simultaneous 
one-shot auction of independent units, at least if the items that are sold have significant 
common value components. Despite the fact that public procurement represents about 20% of 
GDP within the OECD countries, innovative auction designs are not often observed in this 
area. One reason is that the bidding procedure in public procurement auctions is regulated by 
rules restricting bidding to a one shot sealed-bid procedure, which do not allow for iterative 
bidding.
1 The use of a one-shot procedure is also known to reduce the risk of collusion 
between bidders. 
 
Using data from both a lab and a field experiment, the purpose of this paper is to explore the 
efficiency and revenue generation qualities of two sealed-bid alternatives in relation to the 
standard procedure to award contracts for multiple units; the standard approach is 
subsequently referred to as simultaneous bidding. Under the sequential bidding mechanism, 
                                                           
1 Article XIII:1-3 of the Agreement on Government Procurement (WTO) states that “the opportunities that may 
be given to tenderers to correct unintentional errors of form between the opening of tenders and the awarding of 
the contract shall not be permitted to give rise to any discriminatory practice,” and that “ all tenders solicited …. 
  3firms are allowed to observe the outcome of bidding on the first contract before submitting 
bids on the second, and so on. The benefit of the sequential approach would be to provide 
information about the outcome of one contest before bidders submit bids on the next. With 
combinatorial bidding, firms are allowed to submit bids also on packages of contracts in a 
simultaneous first-price sealed bid setting which is another way of reducing the uncertainty 
that comes with multiple bids and eliminate the exposure problem.
2  
 
Theory provides limited guidance as to general predictions concerning revenue and efficiency 
ranking of multi-unit auction mechanisms, when some bidders have economies and other 
diseconomies in the number of contracts they are awarded. Within the independent private 
values model, Krishna and Rosenthal (1996) compare the revenues in a second-price sealed-
bid environment where objects are auctioned out simultaneously with package bids and a 
sequential auction. Given their parameterization of the distribution of bidders’ values, the 
number of global (large) and local (small) bidders and the number of objects auctioned, they 
show that both the ‘standard’ simultaneous and the sequential auctions yield higher revenue 
than does the combinatorial auction, at least when there is only one global bidder. This is due 
to the more aggressive bidding by the global bidder in order to exploit synergies under the 
standard bidding format. By submitting bids on separate contracts, which are above the 
valuation for each separate contract, the bidder makes a loss in case he wins only a fraction of 
the contracts. This risk of a negative profit is compensated by the global bidders’ gains in case 
of winning all contracts.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
shall be received and opened under procedures and conditions guaranteeing the regularity of the openings.”     
2 Combinatorial bidding can differ considerably and the lab and field experiments reported here only represent 
two simple versions of this much more general mechanism. 
  4Several experimental studies have, however, arrived at an opposite revenue ranking. Ledyard 
et al. (1997), and Bykowsky et al. (1998) demonstrate that a combinatorial bidding 
mechanism dominates other mechanisms, both in revenues and efficiency. In a laboratory 
environment, Cybernomics, Inc (2000b) compares the performance of two multiple round 
auctions, one without (SMR) and one allowing for package bids (combinatorial). The 
combinatorial auction generates higher efficiency but lower revenues than the auction without 
packages bids, the reason being that bidders in the SMR auction make losses because of failed 
contract aggregations. Further, field applications of procurement auctions where suppliers 
have had the option to submit bids on bundles of contracts, have generated substantial savings 
in procurement costs [see Ledyard et al. (2000) (transportation services), and Trade 
Extensions (2001) (wooden packaging material)]. 
 
In contrast to the above references, the ‘small’ or ‘local’ bidders in our experimental testbed 
are assumed to have decreasing returns to scale in the number of contracts. While there are 
results indicating that with only small firms taking part in the auction, it is in the procurer’s 
interest that the contracts are auctioned out sequentially and not simultaneously [see 
Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Weber (1979), Lang and Rosenthal (1991) and Ungern-Sternberg 
(1991)], we know less about the combination of small and large bidders. In the absence of 
clear theoretical predictions, we have difficulties in benchmarking the results and the results 
reported below therefore rely on a systematic comparison of outcomes from mechanisms for 
the lab experiment. 
 
The outline of the paper is the following. Section 2 describes the process of a real govern-
mental procurement auction, constituting the basis from which the present paper’s lab and 
field experiments have grown. The lab experiment, its design and results, are presented in 
  5section 3, the subsequent field experiment is reported in section 4 and section 5 concludes. 
 
  
2. THE PROCUREMENT AUCTIONS OF ROAD MARKINGS IN SWEDEN 
Every year, the Road Administration contracts firms for the maintenance of road markings. 
Each of the seven regional offices of the Administration is responsible for the procurement of 
such services in the counties (being between two and five) under its rule. In each county, 
there are often two or three separate classes of contracts which are all very similar in nature; 
up to a linear transformation, painting a road in one place using a certain technique is very 
similar to this same activity, or a different technical version of it, undertaken elsewhere. In 
total, there are 50-60 contracts auctioned out, each valid for one year at a time. Between 
1993-98, the Road Administration spent an annual average of SEK 100 million  (USD 10 
million) on the procurement of road painting.  
 
The procurement process is identical across regions. Each contract is awarded by means of a 
first-price sealed bid auction and all contracts within the region have the same bidding 
deadline. Bids on one contract are evaluated independently of the bids submitted on any other 
contract. A bid consists of a set of prices (price per meter) for various types of road marking 
lines. The competitive bid is then computed as a weighted average of these separate prices; 
the weight attached to each individual price is common knowledge. Bidding on packages is 
not allowed. The periods of time required for evaluating the bids in all regions fully or 
partially overlap,
3 and the procurement of road markings may thus be described as 50-60 first-
price sealed bid auctions, run simultaneously and independently.  
 
                                                           
3 In 1999, the number of overlapping auctions was 53 out of a total of 55. 
  6About eight firms are active in bidding for the contracts. Two of them are relatively large and 
operate in most counties, whereas the others are more or less local, operating in adjacent 
counties only. The two large firms win about 50% of the contracts. During the period 1993-
1999, on average 4.7 bids were submitted on each contract. 
 
Minutes from the procurement auctions provide examples of firms that – except for 
submitting bids for each of the contracts – have also made offers with either a discount on a 
bundle (a large firm has, for instance, made an offer to lower its bid on two adjacent contracts 
by 5%, given that is awarded both) or with restrictions on the number of contracts the firm 
can fulfill, given that it wins “too many”. One motive given by the Road Administration for 
not taking these side-bids and restrictions into account is the computational problem of 
finding the optimal cost minimizing allocation.  
  
 
3. THE LAB EXPERIMENT 
Based on the above elements of the real-life process, we have designed a lab experiment with 
the purpose of comparing three bidding mechanisms to procure multiple units provided by 
bidders with induced non-constant costs. Each experimental session consisted of a series of 
auction periods where three identical contracts, A, B and C were subject to bidding. Five 
subjects participated in each session, two of type 1 and three of type 2. The subjects’ costs of 
fulfilling the fictitious contracts were randomly determined in each period, according to 
procedures described below, and they made profit by winning one or several contracts. In 
each period, the low bidder(s) made a profit equal to his (their) low bid(s) less his (their) 
induced cost of the contract(s); other subjects earned nothing.  
 
  7Prior to bidding in each period p, the two bidders of type 1 faced a cost   (i=1,2) randomly 
and independently drawn from the uniform distribution 
p
i c
[ ] 200 300 ,
p
] 160 220 ,
p
, one for each bidder. 
Similarly, the three bidders of type 2 faced a cost   (j=3,4,5) drawn from the uniform 
distribution [ . The superscript p (p= 1... 15) denotes that the same set of randomly 
generated costs,  and   was used for each session.  
j c
p
i c j c
 
The production costs of the two type 1 bidders were decreasing in the number of contracts, 
with identical scale parameters for the two bidders. If a bidder won one of the contracts in the 
period, his cost equaled   (cf. table 1). If the same bidder won two contracts in the same 
period, the cost decreased to 0.9 × c  per contract and if he won all three contracts, the unit 
cost was 0.8 ×  . The three type 2 bidders faced an increasing unit cost function, again with 
identical scale parameters across bidders. The cost was equal to   if winning one of the 
contracts, winning two contracts in the same period made the cost increase to 1.1 ×   and, 














The purpose of this design was to mimic the observed number and size composition of 
bidders. First, it is difficult to believe that entrepreneurs would continue to be of different 
sizes if there were no real reasons for this; the presence of scale (dis-) economies being one 
such reason. Second, it would have been feasible to represent ‘small’ entrepreneurs with 
constant-cost functions. Such bidders, however, often want to restrict the number of contracts 
they can win, one possible reason being that they have capacity restrictions, here modeled as 
increasing costs. The random draw for the small bidders (type 2) then had to be made from a 
different support than that of the large bidders (type 1). If the cost for both types had been 
  8drawn from the same distribution, then the chances for type 2 of winning any contract would 
have been small, given the number of contracts auctioned out and the size of the scale 
parameters.  
 
                           Table 1. Induced costs for bidders of type 1 and type 2. 
  Type 1  Type 2 
Number of bidders  2  3 
Support []   cc ij ij ,, , [200, 300]i [160,220]j 
Average cost for one contract (A, B or C)  ci   c j  
Average cost for two contracts (AB, AC or BC)  0.9 × ci 1.1  × cj 
Average cost for three contracts (ABC)  0.8 × ci 1.2  × cj 
 
 
When arriving at the lab, each subject was randomly assigned to be either type 1 or type 2 and 
remained the same type throughout the session. A show-up fee of SEK 100 was paid.
4 In 
addition, each bidder was provided with SEK 50 for the purse, meaning that bids generating 
losses were accepted up to a deficit of this amount. The first five bidding periods made use of 
an exchange rate of SEK 0.5 for each experimental currency unit, the next five periods had a 
one-to-one exchange rate and the final five periods paid SEK 3 for each experimental 
currency unit. In addition, bidders did not have to carry the losses from the first five periods 
with them. These design aspects were used to reduce the risk of having to terminate a session 
before the participants had understood the logic of the game.  
 
The contents of table 1 were common knowledge prior to bidding, meaning that bidders knew 
their own valuation and type, the distribution from which the valuations of the others were 
drawn, and the number of bidders of each type. A session was initiated with two shorter 
training  periods. The subjects were students from the business administration and economics 
programs at Uppsala University and Dalarna University. Each session took up to two hours to 
  9conclude. Earnings ranged from the guaranteed amount up to SEK 400. The treatment 
variable was the auction mechanism with the following three one-shot bidding mechanisms 
being tested.  
 
Simultaneous first-price sealed bid. In each period, the subjects submitted bids 
simultaneously for all three contracts. The bids on one contract were evaluated independently 
of the bids on the others, and the contract was awarded to the lowest bidder on that contract. 
In order to avoid an ordering effect (always place the highest/lowest bid in the first empty 
field on the screen), the three contracts were displayed on the screen in a randomized order; 
sometimes A, B, C, on other occasions B, A, C, etc.  After each period, the winner(s) and the 
winning bids were reported to everyone and the profits reported to those who were awarded a 
contract.  
 
Sequential first-price sealed bid. Subjects submitted bids in a sequential order for the three 
contracts; the assignment of the first contract (contract A) was reported prior to bidding for 
the second contract (contract B), and the assignment of the second contract was reported prior 
to bidding for the third. It was not announced whether a contract had been awarded to a small 
or a large bidder. When all contracts had been awarded, the winner(s) was (were) informed 
about his (their) profits.  
  
Combinatorial first-price sealed bid. In addition to placing separate and independent bids for 
contracts A, B and C, subjects were also allowed – but not required – to place bids on all other 
combinations of contracts. Each subject could therefore submit seven bids; one on each single 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
4 The exchange rate during the fall of 1999 was about SEK 8 for each $US. 
  10contract and bids on packages AB, AC, BC and ABC.
5 The winning combination was the 
combination of bids on the three contracts yielding the lowest procurement cost. Subjects part 
of the winning combination were awarded their contract(s) and their profit equaled their 
bid(s) less their cost for the number of contract(s) won.  
 
 
4. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
Nine experimental sessions were conducted, each mechanism replicated in three sessions, 
where each session consisted of 12 or 15 periods (cf. table 2).  
                 Table 2. Number of periods performed across mechanisms 
 
  Bidding mechanism 
Simultaneous Sequential Combinatorial 
12 12 12 
12 15 15 
15 15 15 
39 42 42 
 
 
One way of measuring efficiency under the three mechanisms is to take the ratio between the 
lowest induced cost of fulfilling the three contracts and the induced cost for the winner(s). We 
have, however, applied a normalized efficiency measure taking the level of drawn costs into 
account. The efficiency measure is defined in (1). 






− =1                                                                                      (1)                     
                                                      
A is the actual costs for the winners of fulfilling contracts, M is the lowest induced cost of 
fulfillment and N is the expected induced cost of a random allocation. For each period, N is 
computed as the total sum of the induced cost of all possible allocations of the three contracts 
                                                           
5 The bidders were also told that they could only win all three contracts on the ABC package bid, not on a 
combination of the three separate bids on contracts A, B and C, or a two-plus-one combination. In the same way, 
a two-pair could only be awarded by a bid on this two-pair, not from a combination of two single-contract bids. 
These restrictions were introduced in order to avoid bidders accidentally placing bids on singletons or two-plus-
one combinations that made them win contracts at bids below costs, which was a real risk in view of the non-
  11among the five bidders, taking the economies and diseconomies of scale into account. This 
sum is then dived by the number of possible allocations, which are (5
3) 125. 
 
Table 3 shows the average and median efficiency for the three mechanisms. We apply a 
Wilcoxon rank test to test for significant differences in efficiency across mechanisms, given 
identical periods. Table 4 demonstrates that the combinatorial mechanism generated fully 
efficient allocations in 28 periods out of 42 and is significantly more efficient than the other 
two mechanisms. 
 
                                       Table 3. Efficiency Across Mechanisms 
 
                               Mechanism 
 Simultaneous Sequential Combinational 
Average efficiency  0.70  0.68  0.91 
Median efficiency  0.66  0.68  1.00 
#  observations  39  42  42 







                          Table 4. Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank tests of efficiency 
 
  z-statistics N 
Simultaneous  = Sequential  -0.45  39 
Simultaneous = Combinatorial  -3.28  39 
Sequential = Combinatorial  -3.64  42 
 
Next, we compare the procurer’s cost under each mechanism. One complication in this is that 
bidders have now and then incurred losses, i.e. been awarded contracts with bids below their 
costs, in various periods of all three mechanisms. In 15 periods out of 39, the simultaneous 
mechanism has generated losses for at least one bidder, the sequential mechanism in 10 out of 
42 while the combinatorial mechanism resulted in losses in only 2 (early periods) out of 42. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
linearities in costs. 
  12To take the impact of such behavior into account when comparing the procurement costs in 
pairs for identical periods across mechanisms, we apply the Wilcoxon rank-test both to all 
possible pairs of identical periods, irrespective of outcome, and all possible pairs of identical 
periods in which the winner(s) did not make a loss.  
 
Table 5 demonstrates that the combinatorial mechanism generates significantly lower 
procurement costs than the other two mechanisms. By only considering periods with no 
losses, the average reduction in procurement costs of using the combinatorial mechanism 
increases from 2-3% to 4%. This is due to the decreasing effect of the winners’ incurred 
losses on the procurer’s cost within the simultaneous and the sequential mechanisms.  
 




Periods with no losses 




 z-statistics n  Relative 
difference 
CostSimultaneous  =  CostSequential 0.47  39 0.008    0.22  14  -0.001 
CostSimultaneous = CostCombinatorial 3.08  39 0.028    3.05  22  0.041 
CostSequential =  CostCombinatorial 2.74  42 0.022    3.49  21  0.037 
 
Table 6 compares the outcome of an efficient allocation with the observed allocation of 
contracts to bidders of type 1 and type 2, respectively. Given our random draw from the two 
distributions of costs, an efficient allocation would have about 50 % of the contracts awarded 
to each type. The observed allocation of contracts to each type of bidder in the combinatorial 
mechanism almost coincides with the efficient allocation. In contrast, an average type 2 
bidder won a larger number of contracts under the sequential than under the other two 
mechanisms. 
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            Table 6. Efficient and observed relative allocation of contracts to each type  
 
                                                                     Mechanism 
Bidder Efficient  allocation  Simultaneous  Sequential  Combinatorial 
Type 1 52%  34%  23%  49% 
Type 2 48%  66%  77%  51% 
 
Finally, there is reason to ask whether our conclusions regarding (relative) efficiency and 
revenue generation qualities materialize for the right reasons, or if the results emanate from 
some arbitrary or unknown underlying process. To test for this, we have formulated a set of 
conjectures regarding the individually rational bidding behavior of subjects of the respective 
type under each mechanism. The overall conclusion is that observed behavior periods can 
indeed be seen to be rational, at least under the simultaneous and the combinational 
mechanisms. Some deviations from what we expected to find under the sequential mechanism 
could possibly be explained by the fact that subjects were not informed about whether the first 
contract was awarded to a large or small bidder, which was also the case when contract two 
was awarded. This might have confused bidders somewhat; to economize on space, the 
analysis is placed in an appendix. 
 
 
5. THE FIELD TEST   
The results from the lab experiment were reported to the Road Administration in September 
2000, and it was decided to make a field test of combinatorial bidding when procuring road 
paintings in 2001. The agency did not want to let all 50-60 contracts be auctioned out 
simultaneously in a nationwide first-price sealed bid combinatorial auction. Instead, it 
restricted combinatorial bidding to be partially implemented in two of its regions, the 
procedure for contracts in the remaining five regions being left unchanged. Software for 
  14evaluating a possibly complex set of combinatorial data was programmed by Trade 
Extensions. The software could, in principle, deal with any types of bids, both package bids 
and so-called XOR bids. We first present the bidding rules of the field test and the results at 
large (in subsection 5.1) and also try to understand what savings, if any, the Road 
Administration actually made from the test (5.2). 
 
5.1 BIDDING RULES AND RESULTS 
The number of contracts subject to bidding was nine and ten, respectively, in the two choice 
regions. Half of the contracts in each region were relatively small, with the cost of carrying 
out a small contract being about a sixth compared to the other contracts. Firms were not 
allowed to submit bids on own-formed bundles of contracts. Instead, prior to bidding, the 
Road Administration specified which – and in one region how many – of the contracts could 
be included in a package bid. The agency feared that if firms were allowed to submit bids on 
the whole sample or various combinatorial bids on arbitrary sub samples, there was a risk that 
larger firms would “take it all” with one aggressive combinatorial bid. For unexplained 
reasons, it was stipulated that a firm submitting a combinatorial bid also had to tender a single 
separate bid for each of the contracts included in the combination. We comment on these 
aspects of the field test below. In addition, firms were given the opportunity to declare how 
many contracts they could accept in case they were awarded more contracts than they had the 
capacity to fulfill. 
 
Nine separate contracts were advertised in Region Middle. Firms could submit an arbitrary 
number of combinatorial bids for a specified sub sample of four contracts. In table 7, bold 
letters represent contracts that could be included in a combinatorial bid. A firm submitting a 
bid for contracts C1, C2, D1 and D2 and ticking the C1-C2 combination with a discount of 
  15five would then reduce its price by 5% if awarded this pair.  
                          Table 7. Contracts auctioned out in Region Middle. 
 
Contract Single  bid 
(SEK) 
Comb. Bid 1     
(mark with √) 
Comb. bid 2      
(mark with√) 
Comb.bid n       






C1        
C2            
U1            
U2            
  Discount in %      
                                      Contracts numbered “1” are large, and contracts numbered “2” are small contracts.  
 
Five firms took part in the bidding in this region. One of them submitted separate bids on C1, 
U1, D1 and T1 with the restriction that it could take two contracts at most; this bidder won no 
contract. Only one of the bidders, here labeled CLE, used the option to submit a combinatorial 
bid on two of the four contracts that could be included, U1 and C1. Table 8 displays CLE’s 
separate bids and the two-combinatorial bid on these two contracts. The discount was 2% of 
the sum of the single bids, meaning that the combinatorial bid was about SEK 142 000 lower 
than the sum of the two single bids on the same contracts.  
              
                         Table 8. CLE’s Bids in Region Middle, thousand SEK 




Combinatorial bid       
(2 % discount) 
Lowest bids including 
discount for package 
C1 2  722  √  2 668 
C2    602      602 
U1 4  383  √  4 295 
U2    804       804 
Sum of winning bids  8 511    8 369 
 
It turned out that this firm had also submitted the lowest single separate bids on each of the 
  16nine contracts; the combinatorial bid made no difference for the outcome of the contest.
6  
Ten contracts were awarded in Region West. Three of these were open to combinatorial 
bidding (cf. bold letters in table 9). Firms could only submit two-contract package bids, that 
is, a firm could submit three combinatorial bids at most.  
                                    Table 9. Contracts auctioned out in Region West 
 







 bid 1 
H1    √  √   
H2        
G1    √    √ 
G2        
V1     √  √ 
V2        
M1        
M2        
K1        
K2        
  Discount in %       
 
Five firms took part in the bidding also in Region West, two of which submitted 
combinatorial bids. One firm chose to submit all three possible two-contract combinatorial 
bids, each with a discount of 3%, whereas the other firm submitted one combinatorial bid 
with a 3.5% discount. The former firm, again CLE, won seven of the ten contracts in the 
region, including the three contracts H1, G1 and V1. As can be seen from table 10, the 
combination yielding the lowest cost is the package bid on (H1+G1), together with the single 
bid on V1 (with a total cost of SEK 4 415 000). The difference between this sum and the sum 
of the separate bids on the three contracts (column one) amounts to 96 000 SEK. In the same 
way as in Region Middle, the combinatorial bids did not affect the allocation of contracts; 
CLE would also have won the seven contracts without them.  
                                                           
6 The table does not include the outcome of the bidding on the other five contracts since they could not be 
included in the combinatorial bid. 
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                        Table10. CLE’s Bids in Region West, thousand SEK 
 




Combinatorial bid  
H1+ G1                    
(3 % discount) 
Combinatorial bid   
H1+ V1   
(3 % discount) 
Combinatorial bid   
V1+ G1   
(3 % discount) 
H1  1 372  1 331  1 331   
G1 1  849  1 794    1 794 
V1  1 290  (1 290)  1 252  1 252 
Sum 4  511      
Winning sum    4 415    
 
 
5.2 DID THE FIELD TEST SAVE MONEY FOR THE ROAD ADMINISTRATION? 
An important question is whether the option to submit package bids made the Road 
Administration save any money. This is certainly the case if a firm’s bid on each of the 
contracts included in a package, mirrors the bid the firm would have submitted in an auction 
without combinatorial bids; if so, the Road Administration saved SEK 238 000. There are, 
however, grounds for calling this into question. 
   
First, Krishna and Rosenthal (1996) show that when bidders face increasing returns of 
winning multiple objects, the separate bids on each object in a (second-price) sealed bid 
auction do not coincide with the corresponding bids in a (second-price) sealed bid auction 
without package bidding. In the former case, the bidder’s dominant strategy is to bid his value 
for the single objects as well for the bundle. In the absence of package bidding, the bidder 
would optimally, in equilibrium, submit a bid on each object that is above his value. If similar 
results held for first-price auctions, the single bids in the auction without combinatorial 
bidding would be lower than the corresponding separate bids in an auction allowing for 
package bids. This result is at least valid when there are a few bidders only. 
 
Second, by considering the behavior of type 1 bidders in the lab experiment, we get 
  18indications that this may indeed be the case. Figure 1 plots the observed behavior of type 1 
bidders against their induced values. Diamonds indicate the bid-sum of the three separate bids 
on contracts A, B and C in the simultaneous auction with no package bids, triangles show the 
bid-sum of the separate bids on contracts A, B and C in the combinatorial setting and the 
quadrants illustrate the package bids in the same auction.  
 
Figure 1. Bidding behavior for bidders with decreasing costs in simultaneous and 
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The total cost of winning all three contracts for each induced value is marked with a cross. 
Markings below the crosses indicate that individuals have been bidding below their induced 
costs.
7 Figure 1 therefore indicates that bids in the simultaneous auction that does not allow 
for package bids are lower than the corresponding separate bids when allowing for package 
bids.
8  
Third, we also have field observations supporting the hypothesis that there is a difference 
                                                           
7 It should be noted that a number of individuals in the combinatorial auction did not submit a separate bid on 
each of the three contracts, thus only bidding on the ABC-package. 
  19between the single bids on each contract in a first-price auction that allows for package bids 
and not, respectively. Table 11 shows CLE’s bids in the different counties in Region Middle 
and Region West over the period 1998-2001.
9 During the period 1998-2000, CLE submitted 
identical sets of prices across the four Region Middle counties. For the year 2001, the firm 
seems to have abandoned this strategy, instead submitting different sets of prices across the 
counties. The highest bids in 2001 were submitted for those contracts that could be included 
in a package bid. 
 
Table 11. CLE’s submitted bids (SEK) for a specific type of road marking line across   
                      counties 1998-2000 
 
                    (a) Region Middle                                                                        (b)  Region West 
 
                               Contract 
 Year  T1  D1  C1 U1 
1998 9.13 9.13 9.13 9.13 
1999 9.45 9.45 9.45 9.45 
2000 6.40 6.40 6.40 - 
2001 5.85 5.90  5.90  6.00 
                                       Contract 
 Year  H1 G1 V1 M1 K1 
1998 9.45 8.8 8.8 9.45 9.65 
1999 10.2 9.5 9.5 10.2 - 
2000 6.8 6.8 6.8 9.5 - 






CLE exhibits a similar bidding pattern in Region West. In previous years, it has submitted a 
set of prices for contracts H1, G1 and V1 that have not been higher than the bids for the other 
contracts. When CLE is then given the option to submit package bids, each bid combining 
two of the contracts H1, G1 and V1, the firm raises its single bids on these contracts above the 
prices on the other two contracts (M1 and K1), which cannot be included in a package bid.  
 
To sum up, theoretical predictions, the lab experiment and our field data indicate that the 
separate bids on contracts, which are also involved in a package bid, do not reflect the 
separate bids that would have been submitted in a world without package bids. Therefore, it is 
hard to estimate if and to what extent the Road Administration reduced their procurement cost 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
8 This result also shows up when comparing the regression results for type 1 in tables A1 and A3 (appendix).  
9 The numbers in the table denote the bid/price CLE charges for painting one meter of road marking, a line 




6. SUMMARY   
The research reported in this paper focuses on the fact that procurement auctions may involve 
contracts for a large number of similar activities, each contract – except for up to a linear 
transformation – being very similar to others. Based on the observed outcome of the 
procurement processes conducted in the last few years, it is clear that two categories of 
entrepreneurs, here referred to as ‘large’ and ‘small’, are awarded contracts.  
 
Using an experimental testbed, we have demonstrated that efficiency may suffer from 
employing the standard, one shot, sealed bid procurement process under these circumstances. 
The experiments also show that efficiency is enhanced and procurement costs reduced by 
admitting for combination bids within the standard simultaneous mechanism. The results are 
based on a particular way of modeling bidders; they have economies and diseconomies in the 
number of contracts awarded and their costs are drawn from different supports. Moreover, 
one specific way of designing combination bidding has been tested while combinations may 
take on a number of different forms. Generalizations from our results should be drawn with 
these facts in mind.  
 
Furthermore, the lab experiment was based on induced private values (costs), whereas the 
cost of the bidding firms in the field may, to some extent, be uncertain and affiliated. For all 
firms, it is somewhat more difficult and more costly to paint roads in bad weather, but, prior 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
hat is, 5,85,
which is 10 cm wide and 3 mm thick.  
10 As an illustration, if we make the assumption that, in the absence of package bids, CLE would have submitted 
the same set of prices for C1 and U1 as it did for contract T1, t  in Region Middle, then the Road 
Administration would have obtained a lower procurement cost than with package bids.  
  21to bidding, no firm knows what the weather will be during the ‘painting season’. An open 
bidding mechanism, where bidders can, to some extent, observe each other’s behavior, may 
therefore affect the firms’ perceptions of their true cost of fulfilling the contracts and, hence, 
the Administration’s procurement cost.
11 This points towards the possible benefits of a SMR 
auction format, which also allows for package bids.  
   
Based on the experimental results, we suggested that the Road Administration should test 
combinatorial bidding and such a test has also been undertaken, albeit with many restrictions. 
Two regions out of seven tried out versions of combinatorial bidding on a restricted number 
of contracts. Firms could submit bid combinations on only a few of the contracts, and they 
were also permitted to place an upper limit on the number of contracts they could accept; this 
is a way of giving, in particular small firms, the possibility of participating in the bidding for 
many contracts while not risking to win ‘too many’. Despite the restrictions, this first trial 
saw in total 6 bids out of 32 being submitted in one way or another, making use of the 
possibility to submit combinational bids, and it was also these bids that won the contracts in 
question. However, we have not been able to establish whether the Road Administration 
actually made any financial saving from the trial.  
 
Throughout the trials, the agency feared that the possibility to submit combinatorial bids 
would make it easier for a large firm to win a large number of contracts, thereby jeopardizing 
the industry’s long run competitive pressure. Our data in combination with theoretical results 
by Krishna & Rosenthal (1996) confirm that this may be a risk, at least if there is only a small 
number of ‘large’ bidders. Even with modest scale economies, it takes a certain competitive 
pressure amongst the large firms to avoid this pitfall, at least when the number of contracts is 
                                                           
11 For a discussion on how individuals’ beliefs about costs and characteristics may be related to elicitation 
  22large.  
 
One way around the problem could be to require bidders to submit both package and stand-
alone bids, a restriction imposed by the Road Administration officials. The chance that bids 
from small firms can be combined with the stand-alone bids of large operators would then be 
greater. This could indeed be countered if large firms submit stand-alone bids that are very 
large, precisely in order to avoid this obvious threat. A possible complementary restriction 
would then be to put an upper limit on the discount, i.e. that it could not exceed, say, 5-10% 
of the stand-alone bid. If anything, this demonstrates the importance of being careful in 
designing the details of any new method for handling age-old problems.  
 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
institutions, see Harrison et al. (2000)   
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  24Appendix 
Analysis of individual bidding behavior 
Conjectures under Simultaneous Bidding  
The average bid of type 1 (type 2) bidders is below (above) the induced cost in order to 
increase the chance of winning all projects (reduce the risk of winning all projects at too low 
bids). There is no systematic difference between bids on projects A, B and C. To test the 






i i k i D D COST BID ε β β β + + + = 3 2 1 ,                                                                                (A1) 
where i (type 1),  i (type 2) and  2 , 1 = 5 , 4 , 3 = C B A k , , = . The dependent variable, BIDi, is the 
bid on a specific contract, COST denotes the induced cost of winning a single contract and the 
two dummies  and  take the value 1 if the dependent variable reflects a bid on contract 
B and contract C, respectively. The regression results summarized in table A1 confirm these 
conjectures. On average, large bidders place bids five percent below the cost while small 
bidders add 18 percent to the cost on an average bid. Neither dummy variable coefficient is 





                      Table A1: Bidding behavior across types – simultaneous auction  
 
 Type  1   Type  2 
Variable  All periods   Period >5    All periods  Period >5 
COST      0,95* 
   (0,009) 
   0,95* 
  (0,009) 
      1,18* 
   (0,019) 
   1,18* 
  (0,025) 
D
B     -3,25 
   (3,14) 
  -0,72 
  (3,25) 
      5,78 
   (5,18) 
   5,34 
  (6,88) 
D
C     -1,44 
   (3,19) 
  -0,65 
  (3,32) 
      2,14 
   (5,17) 
  -0,20 











                             Standard error in parentheses, *significant at the (at least) 5 % level 
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Conjectures under Sequential Bidding  
The average bid of type 1 (type 2) is below (above) the induced cost in order to increase 
(reduce) the chance of winning all contracts. Type 1 bidders then reduce their bids after 
having won a contract and without a win they increase their bids. Type 2 bidders increase 
their bids after having won a contract, and without a win, they do not change their bidding 
behavior. To test the conjectures, we estimate equation (A2). The five dummy variables are 
used to represent the outcomes as given below and the regression results are summarized in 
table A2. 
 










2 1 ,                                          (A2) 
D
1 = 1 if bid on B when A is won 
D
2 = 1 if bid on B when A is NOT won 
D
3 = 1 if bid on C when A OR B is won 
D
4 = 1 if bid on C when A AND B is won 
D
5 = 1 if bid on C when neither A nor B is won   
 
                      Table A2: Bidding behavior across types – sequential auction  
 
 Type  1  T y p e   2  
Variable  All periods  Period >5    All periods  Period >5 































































                              Standard error in parentheses, *significant at the (at least) 5 % level  
 
Considering the behavior of type 2 it is clear that the conjecture regarding D
5 is not confirmed 
by data. If these bidders have not won any item before, they seem to change their bidding 
  26behavior in the last round. This could possibly be a result of subjects not being informed 
about whether a type 1 or type 2 bidder had been awarded previous contracts. In other 
respects, our conjectures are not contradicted by observed behavior, however.  
 
Conjectures under Combinatorial Bidding  
Under this mechanism, up to seven bids from each bidder were received.  For our purpose, 
this is partially redundant information since a bid on the single project A in all respects 
provides the same information as a bid on the single project B, which once more is the same 
as the bid on a single project C; no bidder will be awarded more than one contract based on 
the singleton-bids. The same argument is relevant for bids on two-pairs. The seven 
observations have therefore been boiled down to three: (i) the bidder’s lowest bid on 
singletons A, B and C; (ii) the bidder’s lowest bid on two-pairs AB, AC and BC (divided by 
two to allow for comparison with the induced cost); (iii) the bidder’s bid on ABC (divided by 
three).  
 
We conjecture that the average type 1 bidder does not submit a singleton bid below his 
induced cost, and that his two combination and three combinations bids reflect the decreasing 
average cost of winning two and three contracts. The three bids of the average type 2 bidder 
on varying numbers of contracts will exhibit his increasing average cost.  The following 
equation is estimated for the two types of bidders, within the combinatorial mechanism 
 




2 1 ,   .                   (A3)    
 
The subscript k indicates whether BID is the bidder’s (lowest) singleton bid, his (lowest) 
combinatorial bid on two contracts or his three-contract combinatorial bid. COSTi is the 
bidder’s induced cost of winning a single contract. The dummy variables D
1 and D
2 take on 
  27the value 1 if BID is a two-contract combinatorial bid and the three-contract combinatorial 
bid, respectively. The regression results are presented in table A3. 
 
For both types, the singleton bids are very close to their induced cost. The option to submit 
combinatorial bids on packages of two and three enables the type 1 bidder to bid a lower 
average price for two and three contracts. The average type 2 bidder exhibits the inverse 
behavior, that is, bidding a higher average price for the two- and three-contract combinations 
in order to compensate for his increasing average cost of winning more than one contract.  
 
                        Table A3: Bidding behavior across types – combinatorial auction   
 
                    Type 1                     Type 2 
Variable  All periods  Period >5  All periods  Period >5 




































                     Standard error in parentheses, *significant at the (at least) 5 % level  
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